

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE PANEL OF THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP

Third Meeting, 1400 hours, 10 March 1975

Minutes

Members present: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC, Chairman
Mr. George Carver, D/DCI/NIO
Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI/CIA
Mr. Arthur McAfee, DD/INR/State
Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., DD/DIA

(for Maj. Gen. Herbert E. Wolff, NSA/CSS)
(Ret), DCI/IC/CS,
Executive Secretary

25X1A9A

NSA & DIA
Declassification/Release
Instructions on File

1. General Wilson reported on activities to date of the NSCIC Working Group, emphasizing the effort has been primarily educational in nature and has focused on the elicitation of comments from Working Group members. He described the difficulties involved in initiating an active Working Group program as stemming from a number of factors, including the inactivity of the NSCIC itself. General Wilson emphasized that efforts are still under way to develop a constructive program under the "guidance and feedback" mission of the NSCIC.
2. General Wilson invited members of the Panel or their deputies to attend the 12 March meeting of the NSCIC Working Group, indicating the main purpose of their presence would be to enable them to raise questions and offer explicit comments where appropriate.
3. General Tighe thought Panel attendance at at least one Working Group meeting would be a good idea, and he wondered whether the difficulty the Working Group was having in getting a program under way might really stem from the heavy work schedules which each of the members had.
4. Dr. Proctor asked whether there was a clear understanding of the role the Working Group was to play, and General Wilson said such role may be only partly understood. He pointed out it had been decided to defer consideration of Terms of Reference until after the Group's program was moving along.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY 246321
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
506R000100180009-7 (single one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine

~~SECRET~~

5. Mr. McAfee noted the average policy maker is so overrun with responsibilities he has no time to ponder guidance--but might respond to initiatives from the Intelligence Community.

6. Dr. Proctor said he felt it was important to tell consumers how they can make the intelligence machinery work for them--where to go and what levers to push or wheels to turn.

7. General Tighe commented that about every six months someone suggests a return to the Eisenhower days of regularly issued policy guidance, but he considered this a vain hope. He wondered if the Working Group might be stirred to action by using them as a sounding board to elicit support in problem areas involving FOIA and the Congressional Select Committees.

8. Mr. Carver doubted that, given the personality and operating methods of its chairman, the NSCIC would really become a functioning entity, and he noted the limitation this posed to the effectiveness of a Working Group.

Agenda Item 1: Guidance from the NSCIC to the DCI

9. General Wilson referred to the IC draft paper, "Proposed Guidance from NSCIC to the DCI," which had been sent to panel members on 20 February. He noted this was a strawman.

10. [REDACTED] provided a redraft prepared by NSA and General Tighe distributed a complete revision of the paper.

11. Dr. Proctor was convinced neither the paper nor its revisions would fly. He considered the real question was how the Working Group can be used. How can consumers help the Intelligence Community? They can be told how to use intelligence--so they can then tell the Community what is wrong with the product. He felt it was up to the Community to raise with the Working Group the problem which the Community wanted fixed. Dr. Proctor suggested the draft guidance paper not be raised at the Working Group meeting.

12. General Wilson agreed, and said he would not further pursue the paper.

Agenda Item 2: A proposed program for the NSCIC Working Group

13. General Wilson distributed copies of a memorandum for NSCIC Working Group members, "Proposed Program for the Working Group," and described the three basic elements of the paper--action projects, informational papers and briefings.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

14. "The explicit expression of uncertainty in intelligence estimates" was the first information paper listed, and General Wilson noted that Working Group members had indicated strong interest in this topic. Mr. Carver thought the topic worth raising, but he noted there are pressures both for and against quantification of uncertainty. He felt it would be worthwhile to alert the Working Group as to the difficulties involved in the phrasing of estimative judgments. General Wilson agreed, and felt the paper should be primarily descriptive in nature. General Tighe said that at some high levels quantified judgments are not acceptable, and he wondered whether any paper on this subject might not end up more confusing than helpful. General Wilson said the paper would respond to questions which the Working Group had raised, and he asked if there was any objection to preparation of such a paper. No objection was raised.

15. "A Handbook on Production responsibilities in the Intelligence Community" was the second of the proposed informational papers. Mr. McAfee asked if this had not already been done for the Select Committee, but it was agreed it had not. Dr. Proctor referred again to his automobile example--"Just tell them what levers to push and what wheels to turn." Mr. Carver was concerned that any effort in this field would "hurt rather than help." Dr. Proctor, however, felt that a paper, not more than 5 pages long, might be useful. It could cover matters such as what an NIE is for, and who is the focal point; what the NID is for and who is the focal point; if a customer is not certain what he wants, how does he contact the proper intelligence office, etc. General Wilson said a paper would be prepared to cover the subject in a "gross, broad sense."

16. "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities," the third informational paper on the list, had been proposed as a descriptive summation of the intelligence priorities presented, worldwide, in the just completed revision of the Attachment to DCID 1/2, but the Panel discussion immediately turned to the kind of reports consumers might be provided on what the Intelligence Community is producing. [REDACTED] said he thought there would be interest in a report as to what guidance documents are produced and on what schedule. Mr. Carver said NIO issuances cover what estimates have been issued and what are being worked on, but he wanted to avoid being put in a strait-jacket through a future projection of planned estimates. He said the present NIO reports were deliberately designed for a particular audience and he doubted their usefulness to a body such as the Working Group.

25X1A9A

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

17. It seemed to Dr. Proctor that each Working Group member wanted to know if his needs were being taken care of, but he was not really interested in what was being done for others. This being the case, each should ask for what he wanted, and if the Community is not already responding then there can be a discussion as to what can be done. He noted that DDI used to put out a monthly report, but discontinued the effort because only specialists were interested. He felt that if a special report were prepared for the Working Group it would be "looked at and lost."

*off finished
intelligence*

18. General Wilson said if he were the Joint Staff Director or a State official, he would like to see a listing of what the Intelligence Community is publishing so he could note what he was interested in and could ask questions if he needed something else. He asked if this would give the NIOs problems, and Mr. Carver said no because the NIOs maintain liaison contacts which meet this need. Mr. McAfee said the INR office directors meet with the Assistant Secretaries of State on matters like this. Mr. Carver said that dissemination of the NIO monthly report could be expanded.

19. General Wilson said he did not envision a new or separate report being required, but he was concerned about a proper response to the Working Group. General Tighe doubted that the Working Group actually was a cohesive group as regards interest in intelligence products, and he hoped it would be possible to avoid institutionalizing any new report. Mr. Carver expressed concern that any such report could become a FOIA item and unnecessarily involve the NIOs.

20. No Panel decision was taken as to what the next step should be.

21. The fourth of the listed informational papers was "A Handbook on the U.S. Intelligence Community." General Wilson said the IC Staff had this under way, and General Tighe said both CIA and DIA had packages which might prove useful.

22. The fifth proposed informational paper, "The compartmented intelligence classification system" had been suggested by RADM Hilton, but General Wilson indicated he did not know why the topic had been raised for Working Group consideration. Dr. Proctor wondered if the Working Group really were interested in whether compartmentation really involves differences in communication channels, in couriers, etc. General Tighe said J-2/J-3 had collaborated on a JCS paper on compartmentation, but J-5 does not consider the system satisfactory, and he wondered if RADM Hilton was looking for support for the J-5 thesis that compartmentation is not really needed.

23. General Wilson said he would advise RADM Hilton no paper would be prepared on this topic.

24. Dr. Proctor asked if it was intended the papers which had been discussed would go forward to the Working Group as briefings or as papers. General Wilson said he intended to provide the Group with papers, and back this up with briefings and/or discussions as appropriate at meetings of the Group.

25. Turning to the list of proposed action projects, General Wilson first noted that the Working Group had raised the possibility of its becoming involved in the development of KIQs, but that he had said it was the Group's role to express needs, but then to let someone else turn these into intelligence requirements. The first of the proposed action projects, "Inputs to Key Intelligence Questions for FY-1976" was intended to define a proper role for the Working Group.

26. General Tighe objected to any Working Group involvement in the actual drafting of KIQs, and Dr. Proctor noted any such involvement would really be by staff members rather than top level consumers. Mr. Carver said he would welcome a statement as to what policymakers needed, but if they were invited to express their needs it must be understood "their prose" may not be reflected in the KIQs which result. He welcomed suggestions and would give review and full consideration to any statements of interest which the Working Group provided.

27. General Tighe said, however, the suggestions should come forward officially from organizations and not through the Working Group as a corporate body. To General Wilson this posed a dilemma since the NSCIC is charged with providing guidance, yet it was being argued the guidance should come only from the separate organizations. As General Tighe viewed it, if the Working Group took itself really seriously it could become a super-USIB, and unless that was what was desired, care should be exercised in getting the Group too deeply involved in the expression of needs for intelligence. Dr. Proctor said that if he felt the inputs would "reflect true needs" he would favor it, but he was ~~not sure~~ *not sure* confident that would ~~not prove to be~~ the case.

28. [REDACTED] noted the Panel had been convinced any request for policy guidance would not fly, and to him any request for statement of needs was merely another approach to the same problem.

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180009-7

29. General Wilson said that if the Working Group could not do something in this area, it would have no reason to exist. General Tighe said the approach assumed the Group members function as individuals and not as a corporate body. General Wilson again asked--if the Group members cannot come up with an outline stating the areas of greatest intelligence interest which should be considered in the KIQ system, then why have the Group?

30. Dr. Proctor asked why the Group could not be asked to comment on KIQs after they had been formulated. General Tighe thought this would be worthwhile. Dr. Proctor said that if "intelligence needs" were requested, as in the proposal, each Working Group member would feel he had to come up with a listing of ten. Mr. Carver questioned whether, in fact, the real needs of senior levels would be reflected, but that if a list of 50 such needs were assembled and then cut back to 20 or 30 in priority order it would be valuable.

31. General Wilson said the Group might be asked how they would change last year's KIQs in preparation for next year. Mr. Carver said this is how the revision of the KIQs works. Each NIO has an inter-agency group, which examines this year's KIQs, discusses the need for changes, talks with both consumers and Community elements, and then is ready to go to the DCI and USIB.

32. General Wilson asked if there was any problem involved in providing the FY-1975 KIQs to the Group for their review. No objection was raised, and General Wilson said the project, as stated in the proposed memorandum to the Working Group, would be "turned around."

33. The second proposed action topic, "Provision of Consumer Guidance to the Intelligence Community," led Dr. Proctor to ask if this were not already being taken care of in the KIQ project. Mr. Carver said that since channels for consumer guidance now exist, care should be taken to ensure the NSCIC actions were additive and not duplicative. He felt detailed comments on this year's KIQs would be a helpful type of consumer guidance. [REDACTED] noted that both DIA and NSA had different sets of consumers not represented on the Working Group.

25X1A

34. General Wilson indicated he wanted to talk on the subject of provision of consumer guidance when the Working Group met. Mr. Carver wondered whether the men who sat on the Working Group actually could speak for their NSCIC member, e.g., could Richard Ober actually speak for Dr. Kissinger.

Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180009-7

~~SECRET~~

35. Re the third proposed action project, "Critique of Intelligence Estimates," the consensus was that such an effort could prove useful. Mr. McAfee said that if the views of "top people" were desired, the less formal the project the better. General Wilson said the PRD/IC considered there is a need for a specific contact in each organization from whom feedback could be elicited. General Tighe doubted that any principal actually would analyze an estimate, he would have his staff do it for him. General Wilson thought that if readers could score the estimate with an "academic grade" it might prove helpful. Several panelists thought marginal notes would be useful. General Wilson said IC would work something out on this.

36. Mr. Carver wondered whether this third project and the fifth one, "Systematic Consumer Evaluation of Current Intelligence Products" should be separately handled, but it was agreed they should be.

37. The fourth proposed action project, "Policy guidance re collection activities against friendly countries," was mentioned only briefly and the panelists agreed this was not a suitable project for the Working Group.

38. General Wilson asked if there were any additional ideas for possible Working Group projects. There were none, and the meeting adjourned with an understanding the memorandum, "Proposed Program for the Working Group," which had been discussed would be revised in the light of the discussion prior to being presented to the Group on 12 March.

25X1A9A


Executive Secretary

25X1A9A
& NSA FOIA

MEMORANDUM FOR: NSCIC Intelligence Panel

SUBJECT: Proposed Guidance from NSCIC to the DCI

1. The DCI's recent report to the President and PFIAB described one of the major problems facing the Intelligence Community in these terms:

"...We must improve communications between the policymaker and the Community. The problem of obtaining improved guidance from policy and planning levels is far from solved, despite the progress described earlier in this report. Additional emphasis has to be put on the need for policymakers to take the Intelligence Community into their confidence when they are formulating plans so that intelligence assets can be brought to bear in time to be effective."

2. In seeking to make progress on this chronic problem, the DCI looks for guidance to the NSCIC, which in the President's memorandum of 5 November 1971, is to:

a- "Give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs;" and

3. Another, and related, function of the NSCIC is to:

b- "Provide a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer."

3- 4. To accomplish these goals, a number of proposals have been set out below. Essentially, they are designed to inform us how the NSCIC can help to guide better and thus be better served by the Intelligence Community, ~~and to provide the DCI, as the Head of the Community, with appropriate~~ guidance to do so; and, secondly, how the NSCIC can provide feedback to the DCI on Community performance in meeting the intelligence needs of top policy and decision makers.

4- 5. These proposals are exploratory and advanced with the understanding that they can be modified or discarded.

I. GUIDANCE:

I- A. MAJOR POLICY GUIDELINES DOCUMENT FOR DCI:

In this proposal the NSCIC would prepare a document describing the major policy lines the NSC intends to pursue during the next year in each major region of the world. The document would also define the major missing information pieces; in effect, these would be the areas in which the Intelligence Community would concentrate its efforts to assist top policy and decision makers. This guidance would go far to assist the Community in establishing understanding the priority of requirements and in tailoring production emphasis accordingly. The timing of this publication ~~to-be-negotiated-to~~ would be such as to have maximum impact influence on KIQs, which would be the major intelligence goals reflecting these needs, and on other IC policy publications.

II- B. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RECOMMENDATIONS TO NSCIC FOR GUIDANCE SHIFTS IN INTELLIGENCE EMPHASIS

One of the persisting myths abroad in the consumer world is the belief that the Intelligence Community can collect anything. This next proposal envisages going to the NSCIC with given topics, for example, Soviet Military Capabilities/Intentions. In briefing the subject, the essential point to be made would be that the West has a fairly good appreciation of Soviet military capabilities, but has ~~a-long-distance-to-go~~ little capability to estimate ~~with-assurance~~ Soviet military intentions with assurance. At this point, recommended changes in staffing patterns abroad, estimates of funding required in various areas to improve our position, and other recommendations could be raised for NSCIC endorsement. Other topics, e.g., Narcotics Suppression, or Terrorism, could be raised. In these briefings, the cost to the IC of pursuing these activities versus benefits obtained

could be described; and endorsement of priorities (or recommendations for changed emphasis to other fields); could be solicited.

II. FEEDBACK:

III. A. CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRESENT INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

This is a program proposal for a program of continuing aperiodic evaluation of intelligence products by top policy-level consumers. It would involve the identification and critique, at least once a quarter, of specific product-or series of products in terms of responsiveness to these consumers. ~~We would envisage this as a serious and wide-ranging evaluation by the consumers.~~ In the case of each product-or family of products, topics to be addressed would include:

A. (1) GENERAL - PRODUCTION

Are substantive papers now dealing with the proper issues, that is, matters of compelling interest to top policy-level the consumers? Are major areas of interest being overlooked? Are they covering subject matter in sufficient depth? Too much depth, including minor issues? Enough or too much analysis? Are they too long? Too short? Just right? Are they clearly written? Are they objective? Are the products timely when the subject demands timeliness? ~~Can a consumer obtain a response in a reasonable time?~~

B. (2) TYPE - PRODUCTION

We are concerned here with types of production, e.g., current intelligence, economic intelligence, NIEs/NIAMs, etc.

Are the families of papers serving the top policy-level consumer? For example, do the current intelligence-type publications serve these consumers adequately? Are there too many? Not enough? Are they deficient in any way? How is the mix as between current and estimative intelligence;

should there be more (or less) of either? Similar tests could be applied to economic, military, basic, and other substantive publications.

In the estimative area, in addition to the general questions above, we would seek guidance on such questions as whether there should be more SNIEs, i.e., a "faster service", as opposed to regularly scheduled NIEs, whether the NIEs should be more reportorial than estimative.

6- (3) NEW PRODUCTS

Evaluation and critique of current production would also be designed to elicit guidance on whether new kinds of products are desired. ~~by consumers.~~

D- (4) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS EMPHASIS AND EVALUATION

1- To the degree possible, evaluation of production would seek guidance as to emphasis. For example, should Latin American production be emphasized or downplayed? Should emphasis on narcotics, terrorism, economic, and other types of intelligence be shifted? Should emphasis on biographic production be increased?

III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

2- A. Can the IC improve its responsiveness by structural changes? For example, would it be useful to place an IC person in the Secretary of State/Defense office for early response to high level needs? By adding a small Intelligence Community element to the National Security Council staff?

3- B. Another avenue to obtain guidance for the DCI would be NSCIC critique of basic DCI documents, such as Perspectives for Intelligence, the National Foreign Intelligence Program recommendations, and National Plans, e.g., SIGINT.

~~SECRET~~